

MEDIA AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Successive evolutions in communication technologies have significantly altered the conduct of conflict, warfare, and conflict resolution. Compared to people of earlier ages, people around the world today know much more and much sooner about major developments in international relations. Global news networks that broadcast live from all corners of the world and via the Internet provide immediate access to unfolding events and, under certain conditions, could influence the way those events develop and end. Evolutions in communication technologies have changed the meaning of power in international relations, the number and nature of actors participating in international political processes, and the strategies these actors employ to achieve their goals. Governments have lost much of their monopoly on information, and non-state actors and individuals have become much more active and significant participants in world affairs, both in warfare and conflict resolution. State and non-state actors are increasingly employing “soft power,” or “smart power,” which integrates soft and hard power, and public diplomacy, which translates soft power assets into concrete actions.¹

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1. Soft power is the capability to get actors to do what you want via attraction and persuasion, while hard power is the capability to achieve the same goals via military force and economic means, including sanctions, aid, and bribes. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., *SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN*

Successful utilization of soft power and public diplomacy depends to a large extent on global communication.

Despite the critical significance of the roles played by media in conflict and conflict resolution, this area has been relatively neglected by both scholars and practitioners. Most existing studies focus on the often negative contributions of the media to the escalation and violence phases of conflict.² Very few studies deal with the actual or potential media contributions to conflict resolution and reconciliation.³ Indeed, the media, particularly radio and television, were instrumental in fomenting conflict and violence in places such as Rwanda and Bosnia.⁴ The Danish cartoon controversy also demonstrates that the media can even cause a violent conflict.⁵ Scholars and practitioners have noticed how the media exacerbate conflict and have concluded that the media's role can be reversed and converted into positive contributions to conflict resolution.⁶ This reversal, however, is difficult to achieve. It is always easier to foment conflict than resolve it, and the media's role in conflict resolution is more complicated than the roles of those dominating the violence phase.

The paucity of research and analysis of the media's role in conflict resolution may be attributed to the difficulties inherent in multidisciplinary

WORLD POLITICS, at x, 5–6 (2004); THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33–35 (Jan Melissen ed., 2005); Ernest J. Wilson III, *Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power*, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 110, 114–15 (2008). See generally ALI FISHER & AURÉLIE BRÖCKERHOFF, OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCE: GLOBAL CAMPAIGNS OF PERSUASION IN THE NEW WORLDS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (2008); MARK LEONARD ET AL., PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (2002); Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories*, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 31 (2008); Eytan Gilboa, *Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy*, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55 (2008) (discussing the basic workings of public diplomacy).

2. See, e.g., MICK HUME, WHOSE WAR IS IT ANYWAY? THE DANGERS OF THE JOURNALISM OF ATTACHMENT (1997).

3. See, e.g., Eytan Gilboa, *Media and Conflict Resolution*, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 455–74 (Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk & I. William Zartman eds., 2009) [hereinafter Gilboa, *Media and Conflict Resolution*]; Eytan Gilboa, *Media and International Conflict*, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT COMMUNICATION: INTEGRATING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 595–620 (John G. Oetzel & Stella Ting-Toomey eds., 2006).

4. See DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, JUSTICE ON THE GRASS: A STORY OF GENOCIDE AND REDEMPTION 1–11 (2005); Phyllis E. Bernard, *Eliminationist Discourse in a Conflicted Society: Lessons for America from Africa?*, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 191–200 (2009); Ahmed Buric, *The Media War and Peace in Bosnia*, in REGIONAL MEDIA IN CONFLICT: CASE STUDIES IN LOCAL WAR REPORTING 64–99 (Alan Davis ed., 2001); Lynn M. Malley, *Observations from an American Conflict Resolution Professional in Serbia on the Effects of the Accessibility of International Media*, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 241, 245 (2009).

5. See generally Bent Nørby Bonde, *How 12 Cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed Were Brought to Trigger an International Conflict*, 28 NORDICOM REV. 33 (2007); Shawn Powers, *Examining the Danish Cartoon Affair: Mediatized Cross-Cultural Tensions?*, 1 MEDIA, WAR & CONFLICT 339–59 (2008).

6. See Gilboa, *Media and Conflict Resolution*, *supra* note 3, at 461–66.

research and the absence of adequate tools, models, and frameworks for analysis. There are serious gaps between theoreticians and practitioners in the fields of conflict resolution, communication, and journalism. Gaps also exist between theoreticians and practitioners within each of these groups. One way to reduce these gaps is to construct a multidisciplinary framework for analysis and practice. This study attempts to offer such a framework.

This work is based on a unique multidisciplinary integration of normative and empirical theories and approaches from several fields: international relations, conflict studies, communication, and journalism. While the field of international relations places contemporary conflict in a proper historical and theoretical context, the discipline of conflict studies provides concepts and analysis of information related to the nature and process of conflict resolution and reconciliation. Communication studies give meaning to the evolutions in communication technologies and media functions. Finally, the field of journalism provides insight into the roles of journalists in society and conflict resolution.

This Article is divided into five parts. Part II explores contemporary international conflicts and suggests significant distinctions between levels, types, and phases of conflict. Part III suggests distinctions between types of media, types of journalism, levels of media, and media functions and dysfunctions. Part IV integrates the different components into one multidimensional and multidisciplinary framework for analysis and suggests how it may be utilized for both theory and practice. Part V concludes.


II. CONFLICT

A. *Levels*

Contemporary violent conflicts tend to occur within, rather than between, states.⁷ Even during the Cold War, protracted limited violence—exemplified primarily in terrorism and guerilla warfare, as opposed to large-scale conventional war—dominated international relations.⁸ Figure 1 shows that at the beginning of the Cold War, the number of internal violent conflicts was higher than the number of interstate conflicts, but that the gap between the two types was small. Since the mid-1950s, the gap has considerably widened. Following the end of the Cold War, the number of violent internal conflicts went up sharply and new conflicts emerged at the global level.

7. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, *THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR* 20–21, 25, 192 (1991). “Interstate conflicts” occur between and among sovereign states while “internal conflicts” occur between and among groups or organizations within a state, such as ethnic and religious groups. “Low intensity conflicts” occur between and among states, but also between and among groups or organizations within states.

8. MICHAEL S. NEIBERG, *WARFARE IN WORLD HISTORY* 93–97 (2001).

Figure 1: Global Trends in Violent Conflict, 1950–2005⁹

Ethnic and civil wars erupted in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and Africa, in places such as Rwanda, Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and Liberia. Further, the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington by Islamic fundamentalists, and similar subsequent attacks in Great Britain, Spain, Kenya, Indonesia, Bali, Turkey, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, as well as the United States-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, represent conflict at the global level.¹⁰ The “clash of civilizations” theory debates the economic and social consequences of globalization and deals with conflict at the global level.¹¹

9. J. Joseph Hewitt, *Trends in Global Conflict 1946–2005*, in *PEACE AND CONFLICT* 2008, at 21 (J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 2008).

10. See Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/> (providing information on more than 80,000 terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2007) (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).

11. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, *JIHAD VS. MCWORLD* 23, 219 (1995); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, *THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY* 419–25 (2005); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, *THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER* 68 (1996); JOSEPH S. NYE JR., *POWER IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE: FROM REALISM TO GLOBALIZATION* 194 (2004).

B. Types

The nature and evolution of contemporary conflicts have generated analytical distinctions between different kinds and levels of violence. Scholars distinguish *High Intensity Conflict* (HIC), where violence is primarily characterized by interstate wars,¹² from *Low Intensity Conflict* (LIC), where violence is much more limited and is pursued by irregular forces against regular armies.¹³ Scholars have characterized the violence of LIC as a “small war”¹⁴ or “fourth-generation wars.”¹⁵ In his book, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Edward N. Luttwak coined a postmodern term—“post-heroic war”—to describe the essence of LIC.¹⁶ These terms suggest that conflict and warfare today are very different from those of previous eras. In the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Defense defined LIC as:

political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.¹⁷

12. STEPHEN D. BIDDLE, *MILITARY POWER: EXPLAINING VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN MODERN BATTLE* 6 (2004).

13. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: THE PATTERN OF WARFARE IN THE MODERN WORLD 2–5 (Loren B. Thompson ed., 1989).

14. Harry G. Summers Jr., *A War is a War is a War is a War*, in LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, *supra* note 13, at 45–48.

15. Thomas X. Hammes, *Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation*, 214 STRATEGIC FORUM 1, 1 (2005). First-generation warfare started after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), and refers to battles fought by states using line-and-column tactics with uniformed soldiers. William S. Lind, *Understanding Fourth Generation War*, 84 MIL. REV. 12, 12 (2004). Second-generation warfare began in the mid-1800s following the invention of new weapons, including breech-loading weapons, machine guns, and indirect artillery. *Id.* Third-generation warfare began with the German blitzkrieg, which introduced the elements of speed and surprise and was used to bypass enemy lines and collapse the enemy’s forces from the rear. *Id.* at 13. Fourth-generation warfare is conflict characterized by battles between state and non-state actors and the blurring of the lines between war and politics, and soldier and civilian. *Id.* at 13, 16.

16. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, *STRATEGY: THE LOGIC OF WAR AND PEACE* 68–80 (rev. & enlarged ed. 2001).

17. Janine Davidson, *Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and Debate* 1, 8 & n.18 (Brookings Inst., Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series No. 1, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0608_counterinsurgency_davidson/0608_counterinsurgency_davidson.pdf (noting that the U.S. Department of Defense has since replaced this definition in its U.S. Army field manuals with definitions more focused on modern

LIC is usually asymmetrical, especially when one side is a state employing armed forces and obeying the laws and rules of war while the other side is an organization or a group employing irregular forces, exploiting the weaknesses of liberal democracies, and systematically violating the laws and rules of war.¹⁸ These characteristics suggest that the goals of parties engaged in LIC are more political than military.¹⁹ The main strategy is to wear out the other side, and the results on the ground are less important because victory is defined in terms of perceptual changes leading to acceptance of demands.²⁰ Usually, non-state actors select this mode of conflict because it best serves their causes.²¹ LIC is long, very difficult to resolve, and requires effective conflict management which, at most, may reduce the level of violence. LIC persists with periods of ceasefire in between waves of violence. The distinction between home and front, and soldiers and citizens, is blurred.²² Often, in clear violation of international law and norms, a violent organization deliberately attacks members of the other side and uses its own members as human shields.²³

A conflict in a particular region may transform across time from one type of conflict to another. For example, in 2003 the U.S. fought a full-scale war in Iraq, but since then the U.S. has been engaged in LIC. The purpose of the first stage, HIC, was to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. The main purpose of the second stage, LIC, was to replace Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime with democracy. The second LIC stage consisted of two interrelated types of violence: a civil war between the Sunni, the previous minority ruling sect, and the Shia, the new ruling sect; and a war between several opposition forces, primarily the Sunni, and the U.S. forces. The two types of warfare are very different and present different challenges for policy makers and the media.

Given the different characteristics of the two types of conflict, their resolution requires different approaches. Protracted violence of the kind that existed in the Balkans, Iraq, Sudan, and Israel and Palestine has been exacerbated by many complex historical, religious, and cultural elements. International and intrastate religious and cultural conflicts are much more difficult to resolve than territorial interstate conflicts. In several recent cases, such as the Balkans, only foreign military intervention stopped the violence

counterinsurgency tactics) (internal quotation marks omitted).

18. See LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, *supra* note 13, at 3–4.

19. *Id.* at 4.

20. See *id.*

21. See *id.*

22. *Id.*

23. See, e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, *U.N. Investigator Presents Report on Gaza War*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/middleeast/30gaza.html>.

and created favorable conditions for effective conflict resolution. Media coverage of LICs is extremely crucial because the main goal of the sides engaged in this type of conflict is to alter the enemy's perception.²⁴

C. Phases

International conflict is a dynamic process that moves through several distinct phases or stages. Scholars and practitioners have identified life cycles of conflicts and analyzed them in chronological terms.²⁵ Many scholars and practitioners have distinguished three basic phases: pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict,²⁶ or pre-violence, violence, and post-violence.²⁷ These approaches are not very useful because they focus on "conflict" or "violence" and treat the other phases as merely insignificant stages that chronologically come before or after conflict or violence. A more useful approach would consider the pre- and post- phases as equally important, and would attempt to fill them with adequate and relevant content. This Article suggests distinguishing four stages of international conflict based on different critical conditions and principal intervention goals: (1) onset-prevention, (2) escalation-management, (3) de-escalation-resolution, and (4) termination-reconciliation. Each phase has distinct characteristics and specific outcomes.

The first stage, onset-prevention, is characterized by the surfacing of conflict, the beginning of disagreements, and growth in hostile verbal and behavioral exchanges. At this stage, only effective prevention measures can stop the conflict from deteriorating into violence.²⁸ If prevention succeeds, the conflict is peacefully settled and the conflict process temporarily or permanently terminates. If not, parties may escalate the conflict believing they can impose a solution via violence. Uses of force include full-scale war, military intervention, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, firing across borders, and deployment of forces. Conflict management—limiting and halting violence to relatively tolerable levels—applies to the escalation phase, which typically

24. See Hammes, *supra* note 15, at 1–2.

25. See, e.g., JOHAN GALTUNG, *PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION* 81–87 (1996); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, *PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES* 12–15 (1995); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, *THE MORAL IMAGINATION: THE ART AND SOUL OF BUILDING PEACE* 41–49 (2005) [hereinafter LEDERACH, *MORAL IMAGINATION*]; MICHAEL S. LUND, *PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICTS: A STRATEGY FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY* 37–44 (1996).

26. ROSS HOWARD, *AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEDIA AND PEACEBUILDING* 6–8 (2002); Christoph Spurk, *Media and Peacebuilding: Concepts, Actors and Challenges* 7–10 (Ctr. for Peacebuilding (KOFF), Paper No. 1, 2002).

27. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management Is Invisible and Indirect*, 37 J. PEACE RES. 131, 132 (2000).

28. See Alice Ackermann, *The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention*, 40 J. PEACE RES. 339, 341–42 (2003).

ends in a formal or informal ceasefire or an armistice.

The post-conflict period should be further subdivided into two separate phases: (1) resolution and (2) reconciliation. The difference between the two stems from the significant distinction sociologist Johan Galtung made between “negative peace” and “positive peace” in his pioneering article, *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*.²⁹ Negative peace refers only to the absence of violence,³⁰ whereas positive peace refers to the building of new relations in many relevant areas between former enemies, including open borders, trade, tourism, and cultural ties.³¹ Positive peace is equivalent to what international relations scholar Kenneth Boulding called “stable peace.”³² Stable peace is “a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter the calculations of any of the people involved.”³³ Other scholars have made a similar distinction between “conflict resolution” and conflict “transformation.”³⁴ According to scholar John P. Lederach, conflict transformation usually involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions, and other people or groups, and it takes place both at the personal and the systemic level.³⁵

In the resolution phase, leaders attempt to negotiate an agreement to end violence. If leaders reach a formal agreement, they may end violence and facilitate transformation. If leaders do not reach a formal agreement, they may resume violence or create a stalemate. International relations scholars had believed that positive or stable peace could be achieved and maintained via security and economic and political cooperation.³⁶ More recently, however, they have become aware of the need to also examine psychological dimensions of this phase.³⁷

The reconciliation phase goes beyond conflict resolution and peace agreements, and addresses psychological and cognitive barriers to stable

29. Johan Galtung, *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167, 183 (1969).

30. *Id.* at 189–90 n.31.

31. *See id.*

32. KENNETH BOULDING, STABLE PEACE 13 (1978).

33. *Id.*

34. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 24–25, 73–85 (1997) [hereinafter LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE]; Hugh Miall, Conflict Transformation Theory and European Practice 3 (Sep. 12–15, 2007) (unpublished paper prepared for the Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, in Turin, Italy), available at http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Miall-conflict_transformation_theory_and_european_practice.pdf.

35. LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE, *supra* note 34, at 75.

36. *See generally* STABLE PEACE AMONG NATIONS (Arie M. Kacowicz et al. eds., 2000).

37. Fen Osler Hampson, *Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third Parties in Ending Violent Conflict*, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 388, 395–97 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001).

peace.³⁸ Reconciliation moves from formal peace agreements to “changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the great majority of the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the parties themselves.”³⁹ Reconciliation is both a process and an outcome.⁴⁰ The outcome is friendship and harmony between former enemies.

The distinction between resolution and transformation of conflict⁴¹ is based on the assumption that even if the opposing sides reach a peace agreement, it is only an agreement between leaders, not between peoples, and it has to be fully implemented and respected over time. Therefore, the distinction between the third phase, conflict resolution, and the fourth phase, reconciliation, is that during reconciliation the parties attempt to move from negative peace to positive peace, or from conflict resolution to conflict transformation. The parties try to fully engage their respective peoples and transform relations from hostility to amicability. Scholar Raimo Väyrynen raised questions about the meaning of transformation and placed the concept in a different context.⁴² For Väyrynen, transformation meant a major change in a principal element of a conflict that includes actors, issues, and rules, and therefore, it may occur at any phase.⁴³ Väyrynen argued that transformation must happen before resolution becomes possible.⁴⁴

Given Väyrynen’s approach and the different meanings applied to transformation, other concepts have had to be identified and used in connection with positive peace. The options are “peacebuilding” and

38. See Herbert C. Kelman, *Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective*, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 111–24 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed., 2004). See generally AFTER THE PEACE: RESISTANCE AND RECONCILIATION (Robert L. Rothstein ed., 1999) [hereinafter AFTER THE PEACE]; FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION: RELIGION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (Raymond G. Helmick & Rodney L. Petersen eds., 2001); ROADS TO RECONCILIATION: CONFLICT AND DIALOGUE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Amy Benson Brown & Karen M. Poremski eds., 2005).

39. Daniel Bar-Tal & Gemma H. Bennink, *The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process*, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION, *supra* note 38, at 11, 12.

40. See Alice Ackermann, *Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process in Postwar Europe: The Franco-German Case*, 19 PEACE & CHANGE 229, 229–30 (1994) [hereinafter Ackermann, *Reconciliation*]. See also Herbert C. Kelman, *Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social-Psychological Analysis*, in AFTER THE PEACE, *supra* note 38, at 193–205; Graham Kemp, *The Concept of Peaceful Societies*, in KEEPING THE PEACE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEFUL SOCIETIES AROUND THE WORLD 1–10 (Graham Kemp & Douglas P. Fry eds., 2004).

41. Several scholars have suggested that transformation of conflict is a “process,” but have defined “reconciliation” as an outcome. Others, however, have viewed reconciliation as both a process and an outcome.

42. Raimo Väyrynen, *From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: A Critical Review*, in THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE RESEARCH 135–160 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 1999).

43. *Id.* at 151.

44. See *id.* at 150–51.

“reconciliation.”⁴⁵ Several scholars have equated the two,⁴⁶ but others have used peacebuilding as a general concept that applies to all the phases and levels of conflict.⁴⁷ This work suggests that the term “termination-reconciliation” best captures the essence of the fourth phase.

Figure 2: Phases of Conflict

Stage/Phase	Pre-Conflict	Conflict	Post-Conflict	
Revised Stage/Phase	Onset	Escalation	De-escalation	Termination
	Prevention	Management	Resolution	Reconciliation
Outcome	Violence	Ceasefire Peace	Negative Peace	Positive Peace

Figure 2 describes the four suggested phases of conflict by stage/phase, revised stage/phase, and outcome. Each phase may end in outcomes different from those listed in Figure 2. For example, if prevention succeeds, the conflict does not become violent; if conflict resolution fails, the parties cannot sign a peace agreement. The listed outcomes typically occur when a conflict moves from one phase to the next, but an international conflict may not move linearly from one phase to another. A conflict may erratically move forward and backward, for example, from management to resolution and back to management. Phases of international conflict are often fluid. Events and processes, such as uses of force, negotiation, and mediation, may appear at

45. See, e.g., ROLAND PARIS, *AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT* 38 (2004); Ho-Won Jeong, *Peacebuilding: Conceptual and Policy Issues*, in *APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING* 3–5 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 2002); Ackermann, *Reconciliation*, *supra* note 40, at 230.

46. Compare Ackermann, *Reconciliation*, *supra* note 40, at 230 (defining reconciliation as “a process by which countries can establish structures and procedures for establishing durable peace”) with PARIS, *supra* note 45, at 38 (defining peacebuilding as “action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace”).

47. See Spurk, *supra* note 26, at 1; LEDERACH, *MORAL IMAGINATION*, *supra* note 25, at 5; HOWARD, *supra* note 26, at 5.

more than one phase. Even when parties seek resolution through negotiation, they may still use force to improve their bargaining power. Failure to reach an agreement may motivate parties to renew hostilities. Thus, force may be used in both the management and resolution phases. While the purpose of using force in the management phase is to impose a solution, the purpose of using force in the resolution phase is to affect negotiations. Uses of force in the two phases also differ; force is more massive and sustained in the management phase, but more sporadic and limited in the resolution phase.

Similarly, negotiation and mediation occur during both prevention and resolution. In the prevention phase, the purpose of negotiation is to peacefully deal with the sources of conflict to prevent violence, while in the resolution phase, the purpose is to negotiate a peace agreement following the eruption of violence. Conflict resolution after war can be both easier and more complicated. Conflict resolution can be easier because parties may be ready to make concessions that they rejected prior to the violent phase. However, conflict resolution can be more complicated because neither side can move beyond its negative feelings over its incurred cost of violence in terms of human and material resources.

III. MEDIA

A. *Type I: Traditional vs. New Media*

Any analysis of media roles in conflict resolution must address both the traditional media (newspapers, television, and radio) and the new media (Internet). Evolutions in communication technologies have created global news networks and various online social networks.⁴⁸ Global news networks can broadcast live from almost any place in the world to any other place. Commentators and scholars invented the term “CNN effect” to describe how dominant global television coverage has become in world affairs, especially in acute international conflicts.⁴⁹ The term implies that television coverage forces policy makers to take actions they otherwise would not have taken.⁵⁰ Thus, the media determine the national interest and usurp policy making from elected and appointed officials.⁵¹

The Internet provides many non-state actors with access to people around the world and, consequently, with endless opportunities to exchange and

48. TERRY FLEW, *NEW MEDIA: AN INTRODUCTION* 102–03, 188–89 (2002).

49. PIERS ROBINSON, *THE CNN EFFECT: THE MYTH OF NEWS, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION* 2 (2002); Eytan Gilboa, *The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations*, 22 *POL. COMM.* 27, 28 (2005).

50. ROBINSON, *supra* note 49, at 2.

51. *Id.*

debate events and processes both inside and outside political entities.⁵² Non-state actors include non-governmental organizations, international agencies, alliances, multinational firms, terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, global news networks, and even individuals. The Internet provides people with access to news from a variety of sources, up-to-the-minute information on events and processes, and different points of view.⁵³ It also allows unprecedented interactivity, from simple talk back to blogs and placement of text, picture, and video on rapidly growing social networks such as Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and MySpace.⁵⁴

Moreover, cell phones allow people to send e-mails, receive information, and produce photographs and videos. The combination of advanced cell phones and social networking inspires the emergence of “citizen journalists” who can at any time report events from houses and streets to the entire world.⁵⁵ The Internet can penetrate national boundaries of even the most closed and authoritarian societies.

For instance, the 2009 protest against the outcome of the presidential elections in Iran demonstrated the new options for communication and influence available on the Internet. The Iranian government attempted to block coverage of the large demonstrations in Tehran and other major cities by imposing harsh restrictions on local and foreign reporters, but the opposition was able to send reports of the violence inflicted on the demonstrators via social networks such as YouTube and Twitter.⁵⁶

Unlike the conventional media, the Internet is almost unlimited in space, is a very fast mode of communication, allows sophisticated utilization of multimedia functions and interactivity, reaches large audiences around the world, is not subject to stiff regulation and control, and is relatively inexpensive to maintain. In addition, web sites and social networks have become sources of information for the traditional media as well as for global

52. JAMES F. LARSON, *THE INTERNET AND FOREIGN POLICY* 48–49 (2004); Juyan Zhang & Brecken Chinn Swartz, *Toward a Model of NGO Media Diplomacy in the Internet Age: Case Study of Washington Profile*, 35 PUB. REL. REV. 47, 47 (2009).

53. Holli A. Semetko, *Media and Public Diplomacy in Times of War and Crisis*, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 639, 639 (2009).

54. See generally Kari Andén-Papadopoulos, *U.S. Soldiers Imaging the Iraq War on YouTube*, 7 POPULAR COMM. 17–27 (2009).

55. DAN GILLMOR, *WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE*, at xix–xxix (rev. ed. 2006); Mark Deuze et al., *Preparing for an Age of Participatory News*, 1 JOURNALISM PRAC. 322, 322–23 (2007); Stephen D. Reese et al., *Mapping the Blogosphere: Professional and Citizen-Based Media in the Global News Arena*, 8 JOURNALISM 235, 239 (2007).

56. See Bernard, *supra* note 4, at 206–07; Editorial, *Iran's Twitter Revolution*, WASH. TIMES, Jun. 16, 2009, at A20, available at www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitter-revolution.

news networks.⁵⁷ Live reporting is no longer the exclusive domain of networks such as CNN and BBC World News. At the same time, however, it is very difficult to verify the authenticity and accuracy of Internet reports, including visual materials.⁵⁸ Audiences may not know who, when, where, and under what circumstances a particular photo or video clip was taken. Without regulation, ethical standards, or professional supervision, any individual posting materials can fabricate events or rewrite them. This is particularly true for conflicts in which each side presents its own narrative and grievances.

The Internet provides many advantages to state and non-state actors, particularly weak and poor actors. Through web sites, states, groups, movements, organizations, and individuals can directly present themselves and their positions to the world, and can cultivate hundreds of supporting virtual communities to help spread their messages. Like a weapon, the Internet also can be used to attack and discredit hostile forces. Through the Internet, actors can respond immediately to unfolding events, address challenges, and exploit advantages.⁵⁹ Actors that do not employ the Internet rob themselves of a highly useful tool for engaging in foreign policy and diplomacy.

B. Type II: Conflict vs. Peace Journalism

Media coverage of international conflict has inspired heated normative and ethical debates on types of journalism. The most well-known are debates about “bystander journalism” versus “journalism of attachment,” and “war/conflict journalism” versus “peace journalism.” Martin Bell, in his work, *TV News: How Far Should We Go?*, criticized conflict coverage by distinguishing between “bystanders’ journalism” and “journalism of attachment.”⁶⁰ He criticized media neutrality and explained that bystanders’ journalism concerns itself more with the circumstances of violence such as military formations, weapons, strategies, maneuvers, and tactics, while journalism of attachment concerns itself more with people—those who provoke wars, those who fight them, and those who suffer from them.⁶¹ Bell argued that journalism of attachment “cares as well as knows; . . . is aware of its responsibilities; and will not stand neutral between good and evil, right and

57. See Deuze, *supra* note 55, at 324–25.

58. See *id.* at 324.

59. See Nojin Kwak et al., *Honey, I Shrunk the World! The Relation Between Internet Use and International Engagement*, 9 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 189, 191 (2006).

60. Martin Bell, *TV News: How Far Should We Go?*, 8 BRIT. JOURNALISM REV. 7, 8 (1997). See also Nel Ruigrok, *Journalism of Attachment and Objectivity: Dutch Journalists and the Bosnian War*, 1 MEDIA, WAR & CONFLICT 293 (2008).

61. Bell, *supra* note 60, at 8.

wrong, the victim and the oppressor.”⁶² Bell’s colleagues in Bosnia, Christiane Amanpour and Ed Vulliamy, adopted a similar approach.⁶³ Amanpour argued that journalists can be objective by giving all sides a fair hearing, but they do not have to be neutral and treat all sides equally.⁶⁴

In the Balkan Wars, however, Amanpour and Vulliamy supported the Muslims and vehemently advocated military intervention against the Serbs.⁶⁵ A similar pattern surfaced in other conflicts, such as the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, in which Western journalists perceived the Palestinians as victims and sided with them.⁶⁶ News organizations, editors, and reporters often ignore the media campaigns on behalf of a particular side in an international conflict because such campaigns violate standards of fair, balanced, and objective coverage. The Bosnia coverage, however, inspired a needed debate on journalism of attachment among journalists and scholars.⁶⁷ For instance, David Binder of the *New York Times* called Bell’s argument against neutrality in warfare “a garbage argument,” and insisted that “[o]ur job is to report from all sides, not to play favorites.”⁶⁸ Further, Mick Hume argued that journalism of attachment threatens good journalism because it neglects historical and political contexts of violence and causes journalists to set themselves up as judge and jury.⁶⁹ Stephen Ward thought that Bell’s concept of objectivity was too narrow and dangerous because journalists may “devolve into unsubstantiated journalism where biases parade as moral principles.”⁷⁰

BBC World News anchorman Nick Gowing added that the attitude of Amanpour and her colleagues was neatly exploited by Bosnian ministers who “usually enjoyed a free ride, their increasingly exaggerated claims accepted as fact by callow interviewers and anchors in distant studios who did not have the knowledge or background briefings to know better.”⁷¹ Likewise, Wilhelm Kempf concluded that journalism of attachment replaced the rules of

62. *Id.*

63. See, e.g., Ed Vulliamy, “Neutrality” and the Absence of Reckoning: A Journalist’s Account, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 603 (1999).

64. Christiane Amanpour, *Television’s Role in Foreign Policy*, QUILL, Apr. 1996, at 16, 17.

65. Amanpour, *supra* note 64, at 16–17; Vulliamy, *supra* note 63, at 619–20.

66. See, e.g., STEPHANIE GUTMANN, THE OTHER WAR: ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MEDIA SUPREMACY 3–5 (2005); JIM LEDERMAN, BATTLE LINES: THE AMERICAN MEDIA AND THE INTIFADA 99, 252 (1992); JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, COVERING THE INTIFADA: HOW THE MEDIA REPORTED THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING 12–14 (2003).

67. GREG MCLAUGHLIN, THE WAR CORRESPONDENT 153–55, 166–77 (2002).

68. Sherry Ricchiardi, *Over the Line?*, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 1996, at 25, 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).

69. See HUME, *supra* note 2, at 4–5.

70. Stephen J. Ward, *An Answer to Martin Bell: Objectivity and Attachment in Journalism*, 3 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 121, 124 (1998).

71. NIK GOWING, CARNEGIE COMM’N ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT, CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., MEDIA COVERAGE: HELP OR HINDRANCE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION? 29 (1997).

journalism with the rules of propaganda, and that in Bosnia journalists served their moral impetus by controlling information and fabricating news.⁷²

Further, journalism of attachment is problematic because it deals predominantly with Western coverage and ignores other types of media, such as the local media.⁷³ The division of people into categories of “aggressor” or “victim” is highly simplistic because it ignores the possibility that people ruled by aggressive leaders could also be victims; victims are not only those being attacked.⁷⁴ Galtung implied that Bell’s journalism of attachment is not a good alternative to war journalism because it ignores the wider dimensions of conflict.⁷⁵

Galtung and Kempf offered alternatives to war journalism. Galtung argued that the media generally follow the “low road” of war journalism in reporting conflict: chasing wars, the elites that run wars, and a “win-lose” outcome.⁷⁶ His alternative approach, the “high road” of peace journalism, focuses on conflict transformation, the people who suffer from violence, and a “win-win” solution.⁷⁷ According to Galtung, war journalism focuses on who advances and who capitulates, keeping score of the cost in human lives and material damage.⁷⁸ This type of coverage polarizes people and escalates conflict because it calls for hatred and more violence to avenge or stop “them.”⁷⁹ It sees “them” as the problem and dehumanizes “them.”⁸⁰ War journalism is driven by propaganda and manipulation and is therefore biased and distorted.⁸¹ In contrast, Galtung wrote, peace journalism explores the reasons behind the violence and provides not only a voice to all parties, but also empathy and understanding.⁸² Peace journalism focuses on all suffering and humanizes all sides.⁸³ Peace journalism is more truthful and attempts to

72. Wilhelm Kempf, *Conflict Coverage and Conflict Escalation*, in 2 JOURNALISM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: STUDYING WAR AND THE MEDIA 59, 59 (Wilhelm Kempf & Heikki Luostarinen eds., 2002) [hereinafter Kempf, *Conflict Coverage*]; Wilhelm Kempf, *Escalating and Deescalating Aspects in the Coverage of the Bosnia Conflict: A Comparative Study*, in 2 JOURNALISM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER, *supra*, at 227, 228–29.

73. See HUME, *supra* note 2, at 4–5.

74. See *id.*

75. Johan Galtung, *High Road, Low Road: Charting the Course for Peace Journalism*, 7 TRACK TWO 7, 7–10 (1998), available at http://www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_4/p07_highroad_lowroad.html.

76. Johan Galtung, *Peace Journalism—A Challenge*, in 2 JOURNALISM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER, *supra* note 72, at 259, 259–60.

77. *Id.* at 260.

78. *Id.* at 259.

79. *Id.* at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).

80. *Id.* at 261 tbl.1.

81. *Id.*

82. *Id.* at 260 & 261 tbl.1.

83. *Id.*

de-escalate violence by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence.⁸⁴ While war journalism attaches only to “our side,” peace journalism is a journalism of attachment to all actual and potential victims.⁸⁵

Kempf built his approach on Galtung’s ideas, but suggested a more critical peace journalism, which he called “de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage” (DEOCC).⁸⁶ Kempf’s approach questions war and military logic, and respects and fairly covers the opponent’s rights.⁸⁷ At the same time, however, a journalist engaging in DEOCC has to be cautious and self-critical to avoid dissemination of “peace propaganda,” which is as counterproductive as “war propaganda.”⁸⁸ DEOCC journalists must maintain a critical distance from the belligerents and equally and forcefully criticize their actions.⁸⁹

Several scholars and journalists have criticized peace journalism. Thomas Hanitzsch, for example, criticized peace journalism and related approaches for being at odds with mass communication theory.⁹⁰ Peace journalism is based on the assumption of “powerful, causal and linear media effects.”⁹¹ Communication theory, however, has produced very little empirical support for this approach.⁹² Peace journalism looks at the audience as an aggregate of dispersed individuals, but communication theory has identified multiple audiences with different characteristics.⁹³ Peace journalism assumes that publishers and journalists, especially at the local media level, can disregard the interests of their specific audiences; but communication theory suggests that this assumption is unnatural and economically impossible.⁹⁴ Peace journalism places responsibility on the media to prevent, manage, resolve, and

84. *Id.* at 261 tbl.1.

85. *Id.* at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).

86. Kempf, *Conflict Coverage*, *supra* note 72, at 71 fig.7.

87. *Id.*

88. *Id.* at 71.

89. *Id.* at 72.

90. See Thomas Hanitzsch, *Journalists as Peacekeeping Force? Peace Journalism and Mass Communication Theory*, 5 JOURNALISM STUD. 483, 484 (2004) [hereinafter Hanitzsch, *Peacekeeping Force*]. See also Robert A. Hackett, *Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing Structure and Agency in News Media*, 5 CONFLICT & COMM. ONLINE (2006), http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2006_2/pdf/hackett.pdf; Thomas Hanitzsch, *Situating Peace Journalism in Journalism Studies: A Critical Appraisal*, 6 CONFLICT & COMM. ONLINE (2007), http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/hanitzsch.pdf; Jake Lynch, *Peace Journalism and Its Discontents*, 6 CONFLICT & COMM. ONLINE (2007), http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/lynch.pdf; Wilhelm Kempf, *Peace Journalism: A Tightrope Walk Between Advocacy Journalism and Constructive Conflict Coverage*, 6 CONFLICT & COMM. ONLINE (2007), http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/kempf.pdf.

91. Hanitzsch, *Peacekeeping Force*, *supra* note 90, at 483.

92. *Id.* at 489–91.

93. *Id.* at 489.

94. *Id.* at 489–90.

transform conflicts, but communication theory does not recognize this role, and sociological system theory places responsibility for these functions on political institutions and leaders.⁹⁵

C. Levels

When analyzing the media's role in conflict resolution, it is necessary to distinguish different types and levels of media. Many studies address only the Western media. However, media is global and can reach audiences worldwide without national, ethnic, or cultural bias. The hybrid "glocal" refers to media that deal with local or national issues, but are capable of reaching audiences around the world, such as through the Internet.⁹⁶ A more useful approach would distinguish five levels of media by geopolitical criteria: (1) local, (2) national, (3) regional, (4) international, and (5) global.

Local media include newspapers, television, and radio stations operating in a town, city, or district. National media include newspapers and electronic media operating within the boundaries of nation-states. Regional media operate in a region defined by history, culture, tradition, values, language, or religion. Examples of regional media include Qatar-based Al Jazeera Arabic and Dubai-based Al Arabiya, which broadcast primarily to the Middle East, and the South African Broadcasting Corporation, which serves Africa. International media include broadcast and print media used or sponsored by states that operate across international borders. Examples include the Voice of America, BBC World News, China's CCTV-9, Al Jazeera International, France 24, Russia's Vesti-TV, and Iran's Press TV. The global media include privately owned commercial television networks such as CNN International and print media such as the *International Herald Tribune* and the *Economist*.

Both the international and the global media reach audiences worldwide, but the international media present news and commentary from the perspective of a particular state, while the global media have no such official allegiance. In fact, several states such as China, Russia, France, and Iran established international news networks in English because they were dissatisfied with coverage of more established global networks such as CNN International and BBC World News, and have accused those networks of having a Western bias.⁹⁷

The global media have more worldwide bureaus and reporters than the

95. *Id.*

96. Barry Wellman, *The Glocal Village: Internet and Community*, 1 IDEA&S 26, 29 (2004), available at http://www.ideasmag.artsci.utoronto.ca/issue1_1/idea_s01-wellman.pdf.

97. See, e.g., Robert Parsons, Russia: New State Channel Goes Global in English, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Sept. 16, 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1061443.html>; *Morning Edition: Iran's Press TV to Rival Western Media* (NPR radio broadcast July 2, 2007), available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11650177>.

international media and cover a much wider variety of global issues, while the international media tend to cover issues directly relevant to the states which own them. It is also interesting to note that both CNN and BBC operate two separate broadcasting systems; CNN International is a global network, while CNN-US is national, and BBC World News is a global network, while BBC-UK is national. The global networks do not broadcast respectively in the U.S. and the U.K.

There are significant differences in approach and content between each network's national, international, and global broadcasts, but very little research has been conducted to explore how wide the differences are and what their implications are. Al Jazeera is a unique case because it was established and is subsidized by the Emir of Qatar. It would be interesting to compare Al Jazeera's Arabic broadcasts on the regional channel with its English broadcasts on the international level.⁹⁸ It is extremely important to distinguish between the local and the national media in conflict regions and external media that operate outside these regions because the local and national media have a much greater impact on conflict resolution.

D. Functions and Dysfunctions

The functional theory of communication could be very useful for any attempt to construct a new framework for analysis of media and conflict resolution. Functional theory is a classic communication theory anchored in sociological system theory, which views institutions, including the media, as performing roles designed to meet the needs of individuals and societies.⁹⁹ In communication studies, functional theory paved the way for several approaches and techniques in modern communication research, including media effects, uses and gratifications, agenda-setting, framing, cultivation theory, and the spiral of silence theory.¹⁰⁰ Scholars have even described functional theory as a paradigm—a master theory in control of most research in mass communication.¹⁰¹

Application of functional theory to mass communication developed over time through several stages. Harold D. Lasswell first suggested three media functions: (1) surveillance of the environment (news coverage); (2) correlation of the parts of society (interpretation of news and information,

98. See generally Shawn Powers & Eytan Gilboa, *The Public Diplomacy of Al-Jazeera*, in *NEW MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST* 53–80 (Phillip Seib ed., 2007).

99. ROBERT K. MERTON, *SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE* 121–25 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1957).

100. STEPHEN W. LITTLEJOHN, *THEORIES OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION* 14 (6th ed. 1999); Douglas M. McLeod & Phillip J. Tichenor, *The Logic of Social and Behavioral Science*, in *MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND THEORY* 91, 103–04 (Guido H. Stempel III et al. eds., 2003).

101. DENIS MCQUAIL, *MCQUAIL'S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY* 46 (4th ed. 2000).

commentary, and editorial opinion); and (3) transmission of culture (history, values, religion, language, etc.).¹⁰² Charles R. Wright added a fourth function, entertainment, distinguished between functions and dysfunctions, and constructed a framework for functional analysis.¹⁰³ Denis McQuail added a fifth function, mobilization, described as “campaigning for societal objectives in the sphere of politics, war, economic development, work and sometimes religion.”¹⁰⁴ Mobilization exists in autocratic societies all the time, in new nations during the nation-building phase, and in democracies in times of crisis and warfare. Mobilization may result from a governmental initiative or from the media’s own initiative.¹⁰⁵ After the September 11 terrorist attacks, for example, the American media self-mobilized and became a significant collaborating actor in the global war against terrorism.¹⁰⁶ Members of the media who engage in this type of mobilization are also known as the “[p]atriotic [p]ress.”¹⁰⁷

Wright’s distinction between functions and dysfunctions is pertinent to this Article.¹⁰⁸ Most approaches to media intervention in international conflict have ignored unintended consequences, both positive and negative. The media may provide useful information to citizens who could be motivated to act against their own interests and the interests of their community. For example, when the media warn of an approaching tornado, the purpose is not only to provide information, but also to help citizens prepare for threats to life and property. A warning, however, could be dysfunctional if it causes panic and chaos or if everyone rushes to the roads and causes traffic jams. Similarly, the purpose of reporting on a bank’s financial difficulties is positive—warning those who have accounts of an imminent threat to their investments—but the result could be dysfunctional if all customers went to the bank, liquidated their assets, and drove the bank into bankruptcy.

Application of the Wright formula suggests that, even if the media are

102. Harold D. Lasswell, *The Structure and Function of Communication in Society*, in *THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES* 37–51 (Lyman Bryson ed., 1948).

103. Charles R. Wright, *Functional Analysis and Mass Communication*, 24 *PUB. OPINION Q.* 605, 609–10 (1960).

104. DENIS MCQUAIL, *MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION* 71 (2d ed. 1987).

105. *See id.* at 146.

106. *See* W. LANCE BENNETT, REGINA G. LAWRENCE, & STEVEN LIVINGSTON, *WHEN THE PRESS FAILS: POLITICAL POWER AND THE NEWS MEDIA FROM IRAQ TO KATRINA* 13–16 (2007); Douglas Kellner, *War Correspondents, the Military, and Propaganda: Some Critical Reflections*, 2 *INT’L J. COMM.* 297, 307–12 (2008).

107. John Hutcheson et al., *U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and a Patriotic Press Following September 11*, 21 *POL. COMM.* 27–50 (2004); ROBERT ENTMAN, *PROJECTIONS OF POWER: FRAMING NEWS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY* 1–3 (2004); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & PAUL WALDMAN, *THE PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND THE STORIES THAT SHAPE THE POLITICAL WORLD* 130, 130–31 (2003).

108. *See* Wright, *supra* note 103, at 609–10.

sincerely interested in positive contribution to prevent, manage, resolve, or reconcile international conflict, the results may backfire. For example, during the prevention phase, the media may wish to create awareness among the public for signs of an emerging conflict or violence. The result could be positive if the warning creates awareness and effective steps are taken to stop the drift toward violence. However, the result could be negative if the coverage produces apprehension that leads to escalated conflict behavior. It is important to educate the public about the sources of conflict and the potential for violence or conflict resolution. If the public is educated, the coverage could be functional, but if the public is not educated, the coverage could be dysfunctional. During the resolution phase, the media may wish to initiate a conflict resolution process and mobilize public support. If mobilization occurs, the coverage could be functional. However, if coverage creates stronger opposition and leads to blocking of the initiative, the result could be counterproductive and dysfunctional. Similar dysfunctions could occur if the media attempts to legitimize conflict prevention or conflict resolution, build confidence, dramatize efforts to reduce violence and begin mediation, create realistic expectations, or present a positive balance of advantages and shortcomings of peace agreements.

Several functions and dysfunctions may appear at each of the four conflict phases, while others may be unique to each phase. In addition, functions and dysfunctions may vary for each of the five basic media functions. For instance, entertainment may include implicit or explicit messages that may either help or hinder efforts to promote peace agreements and reconciliation.¹⁰⁹ In sum, all of the potential functions and dysfunctions are relevant to the study of media coverage and intervention in conflict resolution.

IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Figure 3 describes the proposed three-dimensional framework for analysis and practice. It combines and integrates the various components discussed in the previous sections. The components were adopted from different yet relevant fields of science: international relations, conflict studies, communication, and journalism. The framework's core is based on a modified life-cycle theory of conflicts and the functional approach to communication. The framework demonstrates how research and practice can be organized to explore positive and negative contributions of the media through the two types and four phases of conflict, the two types and five

109. See generally MATTHEW A. BAUM, *SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE* 97–133 (2003).

levels of media, and the five media functions and dysfunctions.

Figure 3: Media and Conflict Resolution: A Framework for Analysis

<div> <div>Type of Conflict:</div> <div>Conflict Level:</div> <div>Type of Media:</div> <div>Level of Media:</div> </div> <div> <div>Interstate</div> <div>High Intensity Conflict</div> <div>Traditional Media</div> <div>Local</div> </div> <div> <div>Internal</div> <div>Low Intensity Conflict</div> <div>New Media</div> <div>Regional</div> <div>International</div> <div>Global</div> </div>								
Media Function:	Prevention		Management		Resolution		Reconciliation	
	Function	Dysfunction	Function	Dysfunction	Function	Dysfunction	Function	Dysfunction
News				Balkans Election Violence		Belgium		Peru
Interpretation			China/Tibet			Belgium		
Cultural Transmission								
Entertainment								
Mobilization		U.S./Iraq War				U.S./Iraq War		

The framework is flexible and allows for partial or selective applications. Researchers do not necessarily need to apply the whole framework to all the conflict phases. They may choose to investigate all five media functions in one phase or one function, such as news across all four conflict phases, or they can focus on one media function in one conflict phase, such as interpretation in reconciliation. Scholars may also apply the framework to each of the five levels of media: local, national, regional, international, and global, or to a particular medium: newspaper, television, radio, or the Internet, within each category. The framework could be especially useful for case studies of different kinds.

Studies included in this issue could be classified according to the typology described in Figure 3. For example, the conflict between the Dutch-speaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons is an internal dispute in Belgium. The Euwema and Verbeke study explores and compares the news functions and dysfunctions of the traditional regional media in the management (escalation) and resolution (de-escalation) phases of conflict.¹¹⁰ For example, the authors noted the failed attempts by the major daily newspapers in both regions, *Le Soir* and *De Standaard*, to inspire dialogue and understanding through mutual exchanges of journalists.¹¹¹ The dysfunction occurred because

110. Martin Euwema & Alain Verbeke, *Negative and Positive Roles of Media in the Belgian Conflict: A Model for De-escalation*, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 139 (2009).

111. On the bridging function and performance of journalists, see Eytan Gilboa, *Global Communication and Foreign Policy*, 52 J. COMM. 731–748 (2002), and Eytan Gilboa, *Media Broker Diplomacy: When Journalists Become Mediators*, 22 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMM. 99–120

the journalists working and reporting from each other's regions could not free themselves from their ethnic biases.

The conflict in Iraq went through two stages; the first was interstate HIC and the second was internal LIC. The short full-scale war the U.S.-led coalition conducted in 2003 to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein was HIC, while the ensuing, protracted civil war and the attacks on the coalition's occupying forces represented LIC. The McLeod article examines the mobilization dysfunction of the traditional national media (the television all-news networks Fox News and CNN-US) in the prevention and management phases of conflict.¹¹² The study argues that coverage of the Iraq conflict by the two networks, and perhaps by the entire American media, was dysfunctional because it failed to investigate and challenge the U.S. government's assertions about key elements in the conflict, such as the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

The conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s was internal and produced waves of both HIC and LIC. The Malley contribution offers a personal perspective both on contemporaneous and historical events.¹¹³ She compares coverage by the local and international media and the traditional and new media in the management and resolution phases of conflict. Malley argues that the international media and the new media offered a more neutral and balanced reporting than the local media. She implies that had the combatants been exposed to coverage of the first two media types, they would have perceived the events in a different and more useful way for conflict resolution.

There is a fierce debate about the nature of the conflict over Tibet. From the Chinese perspective, it is an internal dispute. From the perspective of the Tibetans, their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and many states, it is an international dispute. Lee's study compares coverage of the Tibet conflict in the international (Western) traditional media and the national traditional Chinese media in the management phase of conflict.¹¹⁴ He suggests that there are more similarities than differences in the coverage of the two media systems.

Violence erupting after elections, primarily in developing countries such as Iran, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe, represents an internal LIC. The Meadow study explores coverage of election violence by the national media

(2005).

112. Douglas M. McLeod, *Derelict of Duty: The American News Media, Terrorism, and the War in Iraq*, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 113 (2009).

113. Malley, *supra* note 4.

114. Andrew Wei-Min Lee, *Tibet and the Media: Perspectives from Beijing*, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 209 (2009).

in the election states.¹¹⁵ By definition, violence appears in the management phase of conflict. The study presents the topic and a series of issues for future research.

Peru suffered from a twenty-year internal armed conflict that began in the 1980s. The violence was clearly typical of LIC. The Laplante and Phenicie study explores the Peruvian national media's role during the reconciliation phase. In this case, reconciliation was designed to prevent any recurrence of violence and abuses of power.¹¹⁶ The authors conclude that the media role in this particular case was mostly dysfunctional. Figure 3 shows that most studies in this issue focus on news, interpretation, and mobilization, and that the results have been mostly dysfunctional.

V. CONCLUSION

Most contemporary conflicts occur at the interstate or global level, and this pattern is likely to persist in decades to come. The great majority of conflicts are of the LIC version, and this pattern is likely to persist in the near future. The sources of contemporary conflicts include strong cultural and religious elements, and, therefore, it is difficult to resolve them. This work argues that evolutions in communication technologies have significantly altered the media's role in conflict resolution and reconciliation. Global and regional news networks and the Internet allow new actors, primarily non-governmental organizations and individuals, to actively participate in conflict resolution. New technology has challenged states, but at the same time provides states with new tools to accomplish their goals. The media's role is especially enhanced by the Internet, cell phones, and online social networks, and is especially relevant to LIC at the local or global level, where the expected results are perceptual and the main strategy is using violence to maximize sympathetic and supportive media coverage.

This Article concludes that despite the critical, growing importance of the media to conflict resolution and reconciliation, scholars and practitioners have not yet adequately addressed the media's role in these areas. Particularly lacking is extensive research on the roles and effects of new media and global news networks. The main reasons for the weaknesses are difficulties and deficiencies inherent in multidisciplinary research and the lack of suitable tools for analysis. This work attempts to fill the gap with a new framework for analysis based on an innovative integration of theories and models from several scholarly fields. Multidisciplinary research is the only effective way to understand the actual and potential positive and negative contributions of

115. Robert G. Meadow, *Political Violence and the Media*, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 231 (2009).

116. Lisa J. Laplante & Kelly Phenicie, *Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue: The Media's Role in Transitional Justice Processes*, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2009).

the media to conflict resolution and reconciliation.

The media can both help and hinder conflict resolution, and it is important to uncover the conditions determining the outcome. If these conditions are exposed, it would be easier to maximize the media's positive contributions and minimize negative contributions. The peace journalism approach has adopted a highly simplistic and probably unrealistic approach to the media's effects. Systematic application of the framework proposed in this Article to case studies at different levels may promote badly needed knowledge and understanding of the various ways the media influence the beginning, evolution, and termination of existing and future international conflicts.

The proposed framework is very comprehensive and requires prioritizing of research projects. Immediate attention should be given to the highly neglected areas. Thus, the first priority should be to investigate functions and dysfunctions of the local media because they directly affect people engaged in conflict and conflict resolution. The next priority should be to focus on the reconciliation phase. This stage is crucial because successful reconciliation is the best guarantee against the resurrection and reemergence of conflict and violence. The third priority should be to focus on the roles and functions of the new media. This effort is especially challenging because of the constant and rapid developments in communication technology. Research in this field must resemble research in computer science. It has to be fast, dynamic, and highly sensitive lest published research results become obsolete. The fourth priority should be given to LIC. Existing research tends to concentrate on HIC. Although HIC is more attractive to scholars because it is more dramatic and spectacular, most existing and future conflicts are or will be LIC.

Given the lack of cooperation between scholars in the different relevant fields and between scholars and practitioners, and given the multitude of divergent concepts and approaches to media roles, it is crucial to integrate and apply theories and models from both communication and conflict studies. It is also useful to integrate the theories and the models into comprehensive multidisciplinary frameworks for analysis. This is the most promising way to move forward. The framework presented here could be a first step toward a new, integrated, multidimensional, and multidisciplinary research effort.